This paper discusses the question of assigning responsibility and liability when one agent’s actions cause another to deviate from their agreements with a third party. It introduces fixed-fraction rules as a way to balance accident prevention and fairness in assigning liabilities. These rules are characterized through an axiomatic approach and can be implemented through smart contracts for automated conflict resolution.

This study examines the impact of sleeplessness and distraction on global stock markets using the FIFA World Cup as a proxy. The findings show that sleeplessness leads to a -26 basis-point daily return, while distraction causes a -22 basis-point return. These effects are consistent across different methodologies.

This paper studies how technology transfer changes welfare in a Cournot oligopoly, taking rent dissipation into account. Firms engage in a patent competition for a cost-reducing innovation, and the winner of the competition may license the patent to its rivals. We show that welfare is reduced when innovations are minor under licensing auction, while royalty licensing never changes welfare. In addition, welfare generally fails to improve when the patentee may choose between licensing auction and royalty licensing.

We develop a two-sided market model where both platforms and sellers charge buyers for access. When network effects are moderate, a dominant platform that attracts more sellers and buyers is more likely to arise. Compared to when platforms split the market equally, a dominant platform always leads to higher consumer surplus and total welfare. Moreover, both of these measures improve as network effects increase. Our results suggest that competition authorities should be cautious regarding complaints related to dominant platforms in two-sided markets, as they may be good for consumers.

We consider a model in which schools and colleges compete for high-ability students, which are independently identified through a costly screening procedure. This independence creates a channel through which students’ preferences affect the strategic interaction between schools – students with competing offers accept the most-preferred one, increasing the screening costs of unpopular schools. When preferences between schools are more heterogeneous, schools screen more, increasing the proportion of students with multiple offers, but paradoxically reducing the extent to which their preferences determine their outcomes. By observing the students’ schools of origin, colleges can free-ride of the fierce competition that occurs during screening.

An industry-wide research joint venture (RJV) does not lead to better technological development or a higher consumer surplus. In contrast, every non-industry-wide RJV leads to strict improvements in both measures. Our results continue to hold when technology transfer is possible. Independent collaboration with technology transfer is an alternative to establishing industry-wide research consortiums.

We study the decentralized implementation of efficient outcomes through multilateral bargaining in the river sharing problem. We consider a class of mechanisms where agents first announce consumption levels and then bargain over monetary compensation. We first determine which mechanisms give incentives to always allocate the water efficiently. Among these, we take an axiomatic approach to single out three mechanisms that guarantee a fair division of the welfare gain.

We study the decentralized implementation of efficient outcomes through multilateral bargaining in the river sharing problem. We consider a class of mechanisms where agents first announce consumption levels and then bargain over monetary compensation. We first determine which mechanisms give incentives to always allocate the water efficiently. Among these, we take an axiomatic approach to single out three mechanisms that guarantee a fair division of the welfare gain.

Severe and unidirectional threat of external invasion fostered political centralization in China. Europe faced a wider variety of smaller external threats and remained politically fragmented. Political centralization in China led to lower taxation and hence faster population growth during peacetime than in Europe. China was relatively fragile in the event of an external invasion.