Innovation

A Welfare Analysis of Licensing under Rent Dissipation

This paper studies how technology transfer changes welfare in a Cournot oligopoly, taking rent dissipation into account. Firms engage in a patent competition for a cost-reducing innovation, and the winner of the competition may license the patent to its rivals. We show that welfare is reduced when innovations are minor under licensing auction, while royalty licensing never changes welfare. In addition, welfare generally fails to improve when the patentee may choose between licensing auction and royalty licensing.

Competitive Screening and information transmission

We consider a model in which schools and colleges compete for high-ability students, which are independently identified through a costly screening procedure. This independence creates a channel through which students' preferences affect the strategic interaction between schools -- students with competing offers accept the most-preferred one, increasing the screening costs of unpopular schools. When preferences between schools are more heterogeneous, schools screen more, increasing the proportion of students with multiple offers, but paradoxically reducing the extent to which their preferences determine their outcomes. By observing the students' schools of origin, colleges can free-ride of the fierce competition that occurs during screening.

Choosing a Production Joint Venture Partner

We study how a firm inside or outside an industry selects a partner among asymmetric firms to form a production joint venture (PJV), in which technology transfer takes place. We show that the partner selected under a two-part tariff contractis always (weakly) more efficient than the one selected under a first-price auction. Comparing these two schemes, we find that a two-part tariff contract can be superior for the most efficient incumbent firm or for an outside innovator, while a first-price auction is always superior for the least efficient incumbent firm. Moreover, in terms of consumer surplus and welfare, two-part tariff contract is always (weakly) superior.

Decentralized one-to-many Bargaining

An industry-wide research joint venture (RJV) does not lead to better technological development or a higher consumer surplus. In contrast, every non-industry-wide RJV leads to strict improvements in both measures. Our results continue to hold when technology transfer is possible. Independent collaboration with technology transfer is an alternative to establishing industry-wide research consortiums.

Research Joint Venture with Technology Transfer

An industry-wide research joint venture (RJV) does not lead to better technological development or a higher consumer surplus. In contrast, every non-industry-wide RJV leads to strict improvements in both measures. Our results continue to hold when technology transfer is possible. Independent collaboration with technology transfer is an alternative to establishing industry-wide research consortiums.

Technical Analysis with R

This is an introductory textbook that focuses on how to use R to test a technical trading strategy. No prior programming knowledge is needed..

TikZ Cookbook

TikZ is a drawing package in LaTeX. It is very useful to draw a professional-looking diagram. However, the learning curve is a little bit steep for a beginner. This is a cookbook that provides step-by-step illustrations on how to use TikZ to draw various diagrams in economics.

TikZ Cookbook Companion

TikZ is a drawing package in LaTeX. It is very useful to draw a professional-looking diagram. However, the learning curve is a little bit steep for a beginner. This is a cookbook that provides step-by-step illustrations on how to use TikZ to draw various diagrams in economics.

Choosing a licensee from heterogeneous rivals

Licensing technology to a rival firm when firms have heterogeneous technologies. If a third firm remains in the industry, licensing technology is profitable. Dependent on criteria, chosen licensees are different. Joint-profit- or welfare-maximization, or auction outcomes as a selection criterion.