This paper studies how technology transfer changes welfare in a Cournot oligopoly, taking rent dissipation into account. Firms engage in a patent competition for a cost-reducing innovation, and the winner of the competition may license the patent to its rivals. We show that welfare is reduced when innovations are minor under licensing auction, while royalty licensing never changes welfare. In addition, welfare generally fails to improve when the patentee may choose between licensing auction and royalty licensing.
An industry-wide research joint venture (RJV) does not lead to better technological development or a higher consumer surplus. In contrast, every non-industry-wide RJV leads to strict improvements in both measures. Our results continue to hold when technology transfer is possible. Independent collaboration with technology transfer is an alternative to establishing industry-wide research consortiums.
An industry-wide research joint venture (RJV) does not lead to better technological development or a higher consumer surplus. In contrast, every non-industry-wide RJV leads to strict improvements in both measures. Our results continue to hold when technology transfer is possible. Independent collaboration with technology transfer is an alternative to establishing industry-wide research consortiums.
This is an introductory textbook that focuses on how to use R to test a technical trading strategy. No prior programming knowledge is needed..
TikZ is a drawing package in LaTeX. It is very useful to draw a professional-looking diagram. However, the learning curve is a little bit steep for a beginner. This is a cookbook that provides step-by-step illustrations on how to use TikZ to draw various diagrams in economics.
TikZ is a drawing package in LaTeX. It is very useful to draw a professional-looking diagram. However, the learning curve is a little bit steep for a beginner. This is a cookbook that provides step-by-step illustrations on how to use TikZ to draw various diagrams in economics.
Licensing technology to a rival firm when firms have heterogeneous technologies. If a third firm remains in the industry, licensing technology is profitable. Dependent on criteria, chosen licensees are different. Joint-profit- or welfare-maximization, or auction outcomes as a selection criterion.